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Roman Cavanaugh, Jr., an enrolled member of the Spirit Lake 
Sioux Tribe, was driving one evening with his common-law wife 
and their children.1 Both adults were intoxicated and began to 
argue with each other.2 As the altercation escalated, Roman 
grabbed his wife’s head, jerked it back and forth, and then 
slammed it into the dashboard of the vehicle.3 After pulling the car 
into a field, Roman’s wife jumped out of the vehicle and hid in 
fear.4 Roman eventually drove away, with the children still in the 
vehicle, and was later arrested and charged with domestic assault.5 
Because Roman had previous convictions of domestic assault in 
tribal court, after this incident, the U.S. federal government 
charged him with “Domestic Assault by a Habitual Offender” (18 
U.S.C. § 117).6 
Roman Cavanaugh’s case was heard in an Eighth Circuit 
district court that held that his previous tribal convictions could not 
be used as the predicate offenses for charges under § 117.7 The 
court made ruled based on the fact that Cavanaugh’s three previous 
tribal convictions were the result of proceedings that occurred 
without legal representation.8 Subsequently, the appellate court 
reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that because no actual 
constitutional violation had occurred, use of the tribal convictions 
was not precluded.9 
Currently, a circuit split exists regarding whether tribal 
convictions in which the defendant did not have counsel can be 
used as the predicate offenses for charges brought under § 117. 
This split was recently highlighted in United States v. Bryant, 
where a Ninth Circuit appellate court denied the use of the 
defendant’s prior tribal convictions to substantiate federal criminal 
                                                                                                                                  
1 United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 593. 
8 Id. at 594.  
9 Id. at 606.  




charges under § 117.10 Conversely, the Eighth and Tenth circuits 
have held that tribal convictions can be used for charges under § 
117.11 
Domestic violence is an epidemic12 that warrants considerable 
attention in the United States, regardless of racial classification. 
Furthermore, Indians are significantly more likely to be physically 
assaulted when compared to all other racial classifications.13 
Holding Indian domestic abusers accountable cannot be done 
singlehandedly by tribal courts nor by U.S. federal courts because 
of the unique relationship between the two governing systems. 
Prior to 2010, tribal courts were unable to impose sentences of 
incarceration greater than one year.14 Additionally, tribal courts 
have primary jurisdiction over their members for certain criminal 
and civil actions.15 Contrary to its U.S. counterpart, if a tribal court 
conviction imposes a sentence of one year or less, that tribal 
proceeding does not warrant court-appointed counsel.16 As 
previously mentioned, this situation has occurred in at least three 
U.S. circuit courts, with different results. 
This Article argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should uphold 
the ability of federal courts to use tribal domestic assault 
                                                                                                                                  
10 United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014).  
11 See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605; United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 
1000 (10th Cir. 2011). 
12 Melissa Jeltsen, Joe Biden: Domestic Violence is a ‘Public Health Epidemic’, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2015, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/20/biden-domestic-violence-
epidemic_n_6911820.html. 
13 Tribal Communities, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE - OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN, http://www.justice.gov/ovw/tribal-communities (last visited Dec. 5, 
2014); see also PATRICIA TJADEN, NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: RESEARCH REPORT – FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (2000), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf. 
14 The Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) has increased the authority of tribal 
courts to impose sentences of incarceration up to three years, however, not all 
tribes have implemented TLOA. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)(B)–(C) (2012); NAT’L 
CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, Tribes Exercising Enhanced Sentencing, TRIBAL LAW 
& ORDER RES. CTR, http://tloa.ncai.org//tribesexercisingTLOA.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2014). 
15 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304(b) (2012). 
16 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012). 
88 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:85 
 
 
convictions in cases that are absent of other alleged improprieties, 
to meet the elements of § 117. Recognition of tribal convictions 
should be extended on principles of comity because: 1) tribal 
sovereignty preceded the formation of the United States 
Constitution, and as such, the Constitution does not govern tribes; 
2) the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal proceedings so 
convictions without defense counsel can never be Sixth 
Amendment violations; and 3) although upholding the use of 
uncounseled tribal convictions would result in unique 
circumstances that are applicable only to Indians, precluding courts 
from subsequently recognizing such convictions would also result 
in circumstances applicable only to Indians; Indian domestic 
assault victims would be left uniquely endangered and vulnerable.  
Following this Introduction, Part I provides a brief history of 
U.S. courts’ treatment of Indian tribes as both dependent wards of 
the federal government and sovereign nations operating within the 
U.S. system. Part II examines the avenues by which Indian tribal 
sovereignty can be upheld in the U.S. federal system. Part III 
discusses the unique relationship between federal and tribal courts 
and the rights afforded within each venue. Part IV examines the 
arguments that have been raised by Indian defendants, advocating 
for preclusion of federal recognition of their tribal convictions. 
Finally, this Article concludes by emphasizing the need and 
importance for U.S. Supreme Court review on this issue. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
To understand the complexity that underlies the relationship 
between Indian tribal courts and U.S. federal courts, this Article 
begins with a brief history of Indian tribal sovereignty. This 
section examines the way U.S. federal courts have historically 
treated tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction and provides the context for 
analyzing the three cases that have led to the current circuit split. 
 
A. History of United States Courts’ Treatment of Tribal 
Sovereignty 
Historically, tribal sovereignty has experienced intermittent 
definitional changes dating back to the Marshall trilogy of cases 
beginning in 1823. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Supreme Court 
held that Indian rights to complete sovereignty “were necessarily 




diminished” upon the “discovery” of the North American land that 
eventually became the United States (also referred to as the 
“Discovery Doctrine”).17 Then, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the 
majority opinion conceded that Indian tribes held similar status to 
that of states, but restricted that sovereignty by labeling tribes as 
“domestic dependent nations.”18 Subsequently, the opinion in 
Worcester v. Georgia stated that, “The Indian nations had always 
been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights.”19 U.S. courts have continued 
to struggle to find a balance between the tribal right to sovereignty 
that preceded U.S. formation, and the need for the U.S. 
government to have ultimate control over Indian lands and tribal 
members.20  
Indian tribes, at minimum, retain the sovereign powers that are 
not limited by Congress.21 As such, Congress retains plenary 
power to affirm, restrict, or eliminate Indian tribal power.22 
Furthermore, Congress has affirmed the inherent tribal rights of 
self-government over Indian criminal matters.23 However, tribal 
authority to prosecute criminal matters is limited in the types of 
crimes that may be prosecuted as well as the punishments that 
tribes can impose.24 In instances of domestic violence, Congress 
has explicitly afforded Indian tribes the ability to exercise “special 
domestic violence jurisdiction” over tribal members and their 
significant others.25 The deviation resulting in the current circuit 
split results from tribal exercises of self-governance over domestic 
assault offenders on tribal reservations. 
                                                                                                                                  
17 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). 
18 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (emphasis added). 
19 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
20 See Philip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall: The Supreme Court’s 
changing stance on tribal sovereignty, 
www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home
/gp_solo_magazine_index/marshall.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
21 Id.  
22 WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 79 (5th ed. 
2009).  
23 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (2012); CANBY, supra note 22, at 92.  
24 CANBY, supra note 22, at 152. 
25 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b) (2012). However, not all cases of domestic violence 
involving tribal members will fall under tribal jurisdiction. § 1304(b)(4).  
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The U.S. Constitution does not govern Indian tribes.26 This 
difference in criminal procedure results in the two sovereign 
systems overlapping each other, which requires some sort of 
accord between the two systems. Limiting the ability of tribes to 
adequately punish habitual domestic assault offenders, and 
preventing federal courts from subsequently using tribal 
convictions to punish habitual domestic assault offenders, would 
leave Indian domestic assault victims in a uniquely dangerous and 
vulnerable state. 
 
B. The Cases Giving Rise to the Circuit Split 
Tribal courts, at a minimum, have the ability to impose up to 
one year of incarceration on uncounseled convictions as authorized 
by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).27 Conversely, U.S. federal 
and state courts cannot constitutionally impose any term of 
incarceration unless a defendant has knowingly waived or received 
the right to counsel, as mandated by the Federal Constitution.28  
Under 18 U.S.C. § 117, “Any person who commits a domestic 
assault within . . . Indian country and who has a final conviction on 
at least [two] separate prior occasions in . . . Indian tribal court 
proceeding” will be charged and could receive a prison sentence 
for up to ten years.29 The act expressly encompasses Indian 
country and its tribal court proceedings, however, Congress did not 
expressly address whether such convictions may be used by federal 
courts in cases where the tribal proceedings did not include 
protections similar to those afforded by the U.S. Constitution. 
 
1. United States v. Bryant 
In a decision issued on September 30, 2014, the Ninth Circuit 
U.S. Court of Appeals held that the federal charges brought under 
§ 117, for domestic assault by a habitual offender, against Michael 
Bryant, Jr. must be dismissed because one of the defendant’s prior 
tribal convictions was uncounseled and thus could not be used by 
                                                                                                                                  
26 CANBY, supra note 22, at 79–80. 
27 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)(B) (2012). 
28 United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2011). 
29 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012).  




the federal government.30 In the opinion written by Judge Paez, the 
court stated that, “tribal court convictions may be used in 
subsequent prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right 
to counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the sixth 
amendment right.”31 
Michael Bryant, Jr., an Indian and resident of the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe reservation, was charged and convicted of 
domestic assault in two separate incidents against two separate 
women.32 Both convictions were obtained in the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribal Court.33 A month after the second domestic 
assault conviction, in June 2011, Michael was federally indicted 
under § 117.34 
Under the Law and Order Code of the Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe, a defendant has the right to defend himself by acquiring an 
attorney at the defendant’s own expense.35 Michael did not have 
legal counsel in either of his prior tribal court proceedings.36 
Furthermore, in a least one of the prior tribal court convictions, he 
was sentenced to a term of incarceration.37 The government argued 
that because the Sixth Amendment does not govern tribal courts, 
the use of the previous convictions should be allowable.38  
In issuing its decision in favor of the defendant, the appellate 
court based its holding on a prior decision, United States v. Ant.39 
In Ant, the court held that because the defendant’s prior tribal 
conviction would not have been admissible if it had occurred 
anywhere else besides a tribal court; the only way such a 
conviction could be admissible in federal proceedings was if the 
                                                                                                                                  
30 United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014).  
31 Id. at 677. 
32 Id. at 673 n.2. 
33 Id. at 673. 
34 Id. at 673. 
35 Id. at 674 n.4. This comports with ICRA, which mandates the right for 
defendants to obtain counsel at their own expense. Id at 675 n.5.  
36 Id. at 673 n.4.  
37 Id. at 674 n.3.  
38 The court only addressed the Sixth Amendment issue in its opinion, most 
likely because in finding the use of the tribal convictions invalid under the Sixth 
Amendment, there was no need to do a Fifth Amendment Due Process analysis. 
See id. at 679 n.7. 
39 Id. at 677. 
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defendant had made a “knowing and intelligent waiver of his right 
to counsel” as required in U.S. court systems.40 Interestingly, after 
the Ant ruling, the same Ninth Circuit appellate court held that the 
federal firearms statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)) was an exception 
to the Ant rule and prior uncounseled tribal convictions that 
resulted in incarceration could be used as the predicate offense.41 
The Bryant decision scarcely references tribal sovereignty in 
issuing its decision. In fact, tribal sovereignty is only mentioned in 
a footnote to provide explanation of the inapplicability of the 
Constitution to tribal courts.42 The lack of discussion about the 
unique status of tribal courts in relation to U.S. courts leaves the 
question of whether the Ninth Circuit adequately understood the 
reasons tribal convictions should be upheld and respected, despite 
being different from U.S. courts. Additionally, the opinion makes 
no reference to principles of comity or respecting tribal 
adjudicatory procedure in its sovereign capacity, which arguably 
weakens the Ninth Circuit’s argument due to a lack of complete 
discussion. 
In Judge Watford’s concurring opinion, he argues that the Ant 
ruling should be reexamined.43 He supports this conclusion by 
discussing the inconsistency of the Ant ruling with the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Nichols v. United States.44 In Nichols, the Court 
held that an uncounseled U.S. misdemeanor conviction, with no 
term of imprisonment, could be used to enhance sentencing for a 
subsequent offense that would result in incarceration.45 
Understandably, Judge Watford was concerned that the holding in 
Ant reached beyond the boundaries of the Supreme Court holding 
in Nichols—which does not completely agree with the Ninth 
Circuit that uncounseled convictions are presumptively unusable.46  
                                                                                                                                  
40 Id. at 676–77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1989)).  
41 Id. at 677; see also United States v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 
2013).  
42 Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 675 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014).  
43 Id. at 679. 
44 Id. at 679–80. 
45 Id at 679.  
46 Id.  




Hypothesizing about the constitutionality of the tribal 
proceedings, had they occurred in a U.S. court, is inconsequential 
because the Constitution does not apply to tribes. As Judge 
Watford frankly articulated:  
 
[T]he fact remains that [Bryant’s] prior convictions 
were not obtained in violation of the sixth 
amendment [sic] because they occurred in tribal 
court, where the sixth amendment [sic] doesn’t 
apply . . . . So aren’t we really saying that the right 
to appointed counsel is necessary to ensure the 
reliability of all tribal court convictions? If that’s 
true, we seem to be denigrating the integrity of 
tribal course . . . . [R]espect for the integrity of an 
independent sovereign’s courts should preclude 
such quick judgment [against tribal conviction 
validity].47 
 
Judge Watford went on to stress the need for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to issue a clear and definitive answer for federal use of 
uncounseled tribal court convictions because of the stark 
differences in opinion between the Ninth Circuit and the rulings 
from the Eighth and Tenth circuits.  
On July 6, 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a 
petition to rehear Bryant en banc.48 Although the court order 
merely states that there were not enough votes in favor of 
rehearing the case, the concurring opinion by Judge Paez  (joined 
by Judge Pregerson) provides a look at the misplaced legal 
reasoning held by some of the judiciary regarding tribal 
adjudication. In his opinion, Judge Paez recognizes that: 1) the 
Sixth Amendment is not applicable to Indian tribes, 2) ICRA does 
not require a right to counsel that is in line with the U.S. 
Constitution, and 3) Congress has made clear its intention to 
“aggressively” address domestic assault in Indian Country.49 
However, despite all of his express recognition, Judge Paez 
                                                                                                                                  
47 Id at 679–80. 
48 Id. at 1042. An “en banc” hearing is when all judges are “present and 
participating.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
49 Id. at 1043–44.  
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ultimately falls back upon United States v. Ant’s ruling (that 
uncounseled tribal convictions cannot be used) because its 
“approach adheres to the Sixth Amendment’s core interest in 
reliability.”50 As Judge Watford highlighted in his concurring 
opinion in Bryant’s first appellate court ruling, isn’t Judge Paez 
really questioning the validity of all tribal court convictions?51 
In this opinion, the appellate court again fails to explain why 
tribal sovereignty and principles of comity do not warrant 
recognition of Bryant’s prior tribal convictions. Interestingly, 
Judge Paez does make it a point to state that “no part of the 
decision in Bryant is intended to express contempt for tribal courts. 
Nor does [the] decision frustrate the purpose of [§ 117] simply 
because it conditions the use of prior trial court misdemeanor 
convictions that result in imprisonment on the provision of 
counsel.”52 Judge Paez’s position does exactly what he says it does 
not, it frustrates the purpose of § 117, as applied to Indian 
domestic assault victims. Congress has explicitly recognized the 
severity of domestic violence and the need to hold offenders 
accountable.53 Yet, if courts are unwilling to provide tribal courts 
the deference otherwise afforded to foreign courts, Indian domestic 
assault offenders are able to escape the punishment that is 
commensurate with the habitual nature of their behavior. 
Alternatively, in the dissent opinion to the reconsideration 
denial, Judge Owens gets straight to the heart of what is at stake in 
these types of cases:  
 
Michael Bryant likes to beat women. Sometimes he 
kicks them. Sometimes he punches them. 
Sometimes he drags them by their hair. He punched 
and kicked one girlfriend repeatedly, threw her to 
the floor, and even hit her. When he could not find 
his keys, he choked another woman to the verge of 
passing out. Although his violence varies, his 
                                                                                                                                  
50 Id. at 1043 (emphasis added). 
51 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
52 Bryant, 792 F.3d at 1044. 
53 WHITE HOUSE, FACTSHEET: THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 1 (2014), 
available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2015). 




punishment never does. Despite Bryant’s brutality – 
resulting in seven convictions for domestic violence 
– his worst sentence was a slap on the wrist: one-
year imprisonment, or what someone who 
“borrows” a neighbor’s . . . magazine from the 
mailbox . . . would face.54 
 
In addition to highlighting the staggering rates of domestic 
assault suffered by Indian (including Alaskan Native) women, the 
dissent opinion emphasizes the inconsistency of punishment that 
results from this circuit split.55 Depending on where an offender is 
located geographically, he may or may not be held accountable for 
his habitually assaultive behavior.56 Ultimately, both opinions 
expressly agree that the resolution of this issue lies at the feet of 
the Supreme Court.57  
 
2. Contradictory Rulings out of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
In United States v. Cavanaugh out of the Eighth Circuit and 
United States v. Shavanaux out of the Tenth Circuit, the U.S. 
appellate courts came to a completely different ruling than the 
Ninth Circuit. Although each court used different reasoning to 
reach the same conclusion, both courts ultimately determined that 
because Indian tribes are not subject to the Constitution, no 
constitutional violation existed that would preclude subsequent use 
of uncounseled tribal convictions for charges under § 117.  
 
a. United States v. Cavanaugh 
Roman Cavanaugh, Jr. was charged with “Domestic Assault by 
a Habitual Offender” after the domestic assault incident described 
at the beginning of this Article.58 The incident resulting in 
Roman’s federal charges was subsequent to three previous tribal 
domestic abuse convictions in March 2005, April 2005, and 
                                                                                                                                  
54 Bryant, 792 F.3d at 1044–45 (emphasis added). 
55 Id. at 1045. 
56 Id. at 1044–46. 
57 United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594–95 (8th Cir. 2011). 
58 Id. at 593. 
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January 2008.59 The previous convictions came out of the Spirit 
Lake Tribal Court.60 Roman never made any allegations of 
impropriety or appealed any of his convictions, notwithstanding 
the existence of a tribal court appeal procedure.61 
In reaching its decision, the appellate court discussed in detail 
prior cases that involved Sixth Amendment violations in U.S. court 
proceedings that resulted in incarceration.62 In what appears to be 
an underlying persuasive element of its ruling, the opinion 
discusses the exceptional nature of using prior convictions that do 
not comport with U.S. constitutional procedure for repeat-offender 
or enhancement statutes.63 The Court cites Nichols v. United 
States, which states that “recidivist statutes . . . do not change the 
penalty imposed for the earlier conviction . . . this Court 
consistently has sustained repeat-offender laws as penalizing only 
the last offense committed by the offender.”64 
The court acknowledged the unique nature of tribal courts in 
order to differentiate tribal convictions from the previous cases that 
expressed great concern about the reliability of uncounseled 
convictions. The opinion then addresses the Ninth Circuit Ant 
holding by differentiating the circumstances of that case from 
Cavanaugh. It explains that Ant is not applicable in this case 
because Ant sought to use a tribal conviction to prove subsequent 
federal charges that arose out of the same incident.65 




62 Id. at 596–600; see Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222–24 (1980) (holding 
that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, that did not include incarceration, 
could not be used to enhance subsequent charges); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 
U.S. 367, 368–74 (1979) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
violated when any term of incarceration is imposed); see also Burgett v. Texas, 
389 U.S. 109, 110–16 (1967) (holding that an uncounseled felony conviction 
could not be used to enhance punishment from a subsequent recidivist charge); 
see also United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1391–94 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(holding that where the defendant was convicted without properly waiving a 
right to counsel, the term of incarceration was vacated but the conviction was 
affirmed). 
63 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 598–600. 
64 Id. at 598–600; see also Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746–47 
(1994) (quoting Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
65 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604. 




In line with the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. 
Shavanaux, the Eighth Circuit based its decision on principles of 
comity and ultimately concluded that in the absence of a 
constitutional violation, use of uncounseled tribal convictions 
cannot be precluded.66 While the Eighth Circuit did its best to 
tackle the complicated relationship between sovereign Indian tribes 
and the U.S. federal courts, the Tenth Circuit ruling in Shavanaux 
proved more eloquent in articulating the substantial importance of 
tribal sovereignty and principles of comity, in ultimately upholding 
the use of tribal convictions. 
 
b. United States v. Shavanaux 
In United States v. Shavanaux, the Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals upheld the use of Adam Shavanaux’s prior uncounseled 
tribal convictions in bringing charges under § 117.67 The appellate 
court based its decision on principles of comity, its determination 
that Shavanaux’s tribal convictions were absent of any Due 
Process violations (as required under ICRA), and its determination 
that the prior uncounseled tribal convictions did not violate the 
Sixth Amendment because the Constitution is not applicable to 
Indian tribes.68 
In the opinion written by Judge Lucero, the analysis of a 
potential Sixth Amendment violation begins with an examination 
of the unique relationship between Indian tribes and the United 
States.69 Judge Lucero contends that a sovereign proceeding 
ungoverned by the Constitution and thus different from 
constitutional procedure does not make the conviction 
“constitutionally infirm.”70 This determination directly conflicts 
with the Ninth Circuit opinion in Bryant. In reaching this 
conclusion, the court reasoned that at the time of the tribal 
proceedings that resulted in the previous convictions, there was no 
Sixth Amendment violation and furthermore, subsequent use of 
                                                                                                                                  
66 Id. at 594. 
67 United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1002 (10th Cir. 2011). 
68 Id. at 997–98. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 997. 
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those tribal convictions would not create a brand new Sixth 
Amendment violation.71 
Additionally, the court determined that the tribal convictions 
did not violate Due Process rights because the proceedings fully 
complied with ICRA.72 Furthermore, the tribal proceedings were 
otherwise absent of improprieties that would preclude subsequent 
use of these “foreign court” convictions.73 
The unique status of Indian tribes as sovereign nations (and 
thus warranting treatment of its convictions as those of a foreign 
court), stems from the fact that tribes and tribal governance existed 
prior to the creation of the U.S. Constitution.74 The next section 
will examine tribal sovereignty and why the Federal Constitution 
does not govern tribes, then briefly discuss principles of comity 
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  
 
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY PRECEDED THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
The determination of whether to allow the use of an 
uncounseled conviction obtained in tribal courts is uniquely 
applicable to Indian tribal members. This unique situation stems 
from our country’s history: the “discovery” of land that became the 
United States; land that Indian tribes were already long residing. 
Although the English conquered the land that encompasses the 
United States, Indian tribes have remained distinct entities.75 
Indian tribal nations are geographically within the boundaries of 
the U.S., yet maintain tribal sovereignty to the extent it has not 
been limited by the U.S. legislature or a treaty.76  
Tribal sovereignty existed prior to the formation of the U.S. 
and thus derives from the tribes themselves and is not reliant on the 
U.S. Constitution for its creation. As Charles Wilkinson articulated 
in American Indians, Time, and the Law, “tribal authority was not 
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74 See Prygoski, supra note 20. 
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created by the Constitution – tribal sovereignty predated the 
formation of the United States and continued after it.”77 Therefore, 
to hold sovereign nations that are not governed by the Constitution 
to its requirements and presume that any deviation lends to a 
presumption of invalidity appears to be somewhat autocratic. 
 
A. Principles of Comity and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
Recognition of foreign court judgments generally falls under 
one of two categories: 1) the Full Faith and Credit Clause; or 2) 
principles of comity. First, Full Faith and Credit requires 
recognition of other jurisdictional judgments within the U.S., and 
otherwise, as delegated by Congress.78 Congress has required Full 
Faith and Credit in certain Indian tribal matters, including 
judgments under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), among 
others.79 While Congress may choose to extend Full Faith and 
Credit to tribal domestic assault convictions at some point in the 
future; at a minimum, courts have the flexibility to extend 
recognition of tribal convictions via principles of comity.  
Second, under principles of comity, courts have the ability to 
recognize foreign judgments deemed appropriate.80 In instances in 
which recognition of foreign judgments is not required, principles 
of comity allow courts to respect the sovereignty of another 
nation’s proceedings, albeit different than our own.81 The primary 
treatise in Indian law, Cohen’s Federal Indian Law Handbook, 
describes the comity doctrine generally. 
 
 [T]he comity doctrine allows the receiving court 
greater discretion to determine whether to enforce 
                                                                                                                                  
77 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 103 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1987). 
78 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
79 See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997); COHEN, supra 
note 76. 
80 See COHEN, supra note 76. 
81 “Extending comity to tribal judgments is not an invitation for the federal 
courts to exercise unnecessary judicial paternalism in derogation of tribal self-
governance.” United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 2011). 
See also Marchington, 127 F.3d at 810 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 
205 (1895)); COHEN, supra note 76.  
100 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:85 
 
 
the foreign judgment . . . a court using the principles 
of comity may refuse to enforce a foreign judgment 
either because it was reached through procedures 
the receiving court views as fundamentally unfair, 
because the rendering court lacked jurisdiction, or 
because the judgment violates a strongly held public 
policy of the form.82 
 
The cases that have given rise to the circuit split are absent of 
any other circumstances that would lend towards presumptive 
exclusion in federal courts.  
Realistically, not all tribal court convictions will be absent of 
other allegations of impropriety, or will be otherwise invalid for 
subsequent use. Extending recognition under principles of comity 
allows courts the flexibility to recognize those convictions as 
applicable and exclude convictions that were obtained under 
suspect circumstances. Within the limited scope and analysis 
provided in this Article, arguing for full faith and credit may prove 
too rigid and limiting on courts to enforce tribal convictions that do 
not warrant extensions. As each Indian tribe is its own sovereign 
nation, each tribe maintains different adjudicatory proceedings (if 
any exist at all). A full analysis of the inconsistency presented by 
these unique circumstances in cases of additional alleged 
improprieties is beyond the scope of this Article and one that is 
required before an argument for full faith and credit extension can 
be made.  
 
III. THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRIBAL AND U.S. COURT 
SYSTEMS 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides 
criminal defendants with court-appointed legal representation to 
assist in their defense if the defendant is indigent.83 This right is 
accorded to all U.S. criminal defendants unless the right has been 
waived. Alternatively, ICRA, which governs Indian Tribal 
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Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 




Proceedings, does not require court appointed defense in cases that 
seek to impose terms of incarceration that are less than one year.84 
In Cavanaugh, the court noted that preclusion of uncounseled 
tribal convictions would result if there was any existence of a 
constitutional violation. 85 However, as Indian tribal proceedings 
are not governed by the Constitution, a constitutional violation 
does not exist. Furthermore, a constitutional violation would not be 
created anew if the conviction were later used as a predicate 
offense for habitual domestic assault charges because the 
protections accorded by the Sixth Amendment apply at the time of 
adjudication.86  
Within the U.S. court system, convictions in which the 
defendant did not have counsel have generally been precluded 
from subsequent use for enhancement and recidivist statutes.87 
However, preclusion from subsequent use does not always mean 
completely vacating the original uncounseled conviction.88 For 
example in Scott, an eighth circuit appellate court held that because 
the defendant had not clearly waived his right to counsel (but was 
then not provided counsel) in a proceeding that resulted in a 
suspended sentence, the imposition of a jail sentence was 
improper.89 However, the court in Scott also affirmed the 
uncounseled conviction itself because it found sufficient evidence 
of the defendant’s guilt.90 As such, arguments regarding the 
reliability-concerns of uncounseled convictions do not appear to be 
universal.  
As sovereign nations with inherent rights of authority over 
tribal members, Indian tribal proceedings are treated as convictions 
of foreign courts. Historically, U.S. courts have used various 
foreign court convictions in U.S. court proceedings, so the use of 
tribal convictions is not as unusual as protestors seek to suggest. 
                                                                                                                                  
84 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2010). 
85 United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 601 (8th Cir. 2011). 
86 Id. at 600; see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002). 
87 See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 110–16 (1967); Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 
U.S. 222, 222–24 (1980). 
88 See United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1391–94 (8th Cir. 1976). 
89 Id. at 1393. 
90 Id. at 1393–94.  
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As the Shavanaux opinion noted, “federal courts have repeatedly 
recognized foreign convictions and accepted evidence obtained 
overseas by foreign law enforcement through means that deviate 
from our constitutional protections.”91 There are no obvious and 
overarching circumstances present in tribal proceedings that would 
warrant a presumption of preclusion other than the presence of 
Constitutional deviation.  
The Restatement of Foreign Relations provides a framework by 
which foreign court proceedings should warrant exclusion. Only in 
cases where a judgment was obtained in an impartial judicial 
system or the court rendering the judgment did not have 
jurisdiction over the defendant should there be a presumption of 
invalidity.92 None of the three courts discussed in this paper 
determined that either situation presented itself in any of the tribal 
convictions. Furthermore, none of the tribal defendants alleged 
non-compliance with ICRA which governed the tribal proceedings. 
 
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act 
Indian Tribes are governed by ICRA (and as of 2010 the Tribal 
Law and Order Act).93 Although the Constitution does not govern 
tribes, Congress selectively applied certain protections from the 
Bill of Rights to tribal members, via ICRA.94 Of particular 
importance in U.S. criminal proceedings are the protections 
afforded under the Due Process Clause. The Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution requires that ”no person shall … be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”95 
Accordingly, ICRA states that “No Indian tribe in exercising 
powers of self-government shall … deny to any person within its 
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2011). 
95 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 




jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person 
of liberty or property without due process of law.”96 
Furthermore, ICRA affords criminal defendants the right of 
counsel in cases that seek to impose a term of incarceration beyond 
one year.97 Thus, as articulated in the Cavanaugh opinion, “if a 
tribe elects not to provide for the right to appointed counsel 
through its own laws, Indian defendants in tribal court have no 
Constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel unless 
sentenced to a term of incarceration greater than one year.”98  
In the tribal convictions of Bryant, Cavanaugh, and 
Shavanaux, the proceedings fully complied with ICRA and were 
absent of any allegations of impropriety. The inclusion of tribal 
convictions in § 177 and the Congressional exclusion of any 
requirements to provide defense counsel in tribal proceedings less 
than one year in ICRA, should logically result in a presumption of 
validity.  
 
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST USE OF TRIBAL CONVICTIONS FOR 
FEDERAL CHARGES 
Indian defendants have raised a number of defenses to support 
the preclusion of federal use of tribal domestic assault convictions 
for subsequent federal criminal charges under § 117. This section 
explains why the arguments raised in Bryant, Cavanuagh, and 
Shavanaux are unpersuasive.  
 
A. Allowing Use of Uncounseled Tribal Convictions Effectively 
Results in Racial Bias 
In Shavanaux, the defendant argued that allowing for use of 
uncounseled tribal convictions in federal charges would result in 
                                                                                                                                  
96 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2010). 
97 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(A)–(B) (2010) (emphasis added). “In a criminal 
proceeding in which an Indian tribe . . . imposes a total term of imprisonment of 
more than 1 year on a defendant, the Indian tribe shall . . . provide to the 
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution . . . at the expense of the tribal 
government, provide an indigent defendant the assistance of a defense attorney.” 
§ 1302(c)(A)–(B) (emphasis added). 
98 United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2011). 
104 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:85 
 
 
an exception that would apply only to American Indians.99 The 
court responded by drawing a distinction between a purely racial 
classification and a “political” classification, with Indians falling 
under the second group, due to the unique relationship between 
Indians and U.S. federal law.100  
It would be hard to deny that allowing for use of uncounseled 
tribal convictions in federal prosecutions would not result in a 
situation that is applicable only to Indians. However, the 
Shavanaux court’s attempt to differentiate between racial and 
political classifications is unnecessary. This differentiation is 
unnecessary because the unique relationship between the sovereign 
nations creates a compelling interest that warrants recognition of 
tribal proceedings. Albeit, in other circumstances, classifications 
that fall along racial lines may necessitate avoidance when 
possible. The result should not be viewed in terms of bias and 
instead should be viewed as recognition of the inherent right of 
tribes to govern Indians in criminal matters. Additionally, such a 
result is necessary to fill the gap that is created by the limitation of 
tribes to impose punishment beyond a certain threshold. 
 
B. Because Tribal Courts Can Be Dysfunctional, the Presumption 
of Validity is Inaccurate 
Each Indian tribe is considered to be a sovereign entity. As 
such, tribal proceedings can vary greatly. Some tribes, such as the 
Navajo Nation, have a well-established adjudicatory system,101 
other tribes maintain no adjudicatory system at all, and many tribes 
fall somewhere in between. Cavanaugh noted the district court’s 
concern about the deficiency of tribal court systems as a whole, 
“caused by a lack of resources [and] the ongoing lack of resources 
to overcome these shortcomings.”102 
The concern regarding the lack of resources available in many 
tribes to properly establish an acceptable court system does have 
merit. However, the tribal proceedings in Bryant, Cavanaugh, and 
                                                                                                                                  
99 United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1001 (10th Cir. 2011). 
100 Id.  
101 THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION, 
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102 Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 595. 




Shavanaux were absent of any allegations of non-compliance with 
ICRA, which provides the requisite standards to warrant 
presumption of validity.103 Recognition of tribal convictions based 
on principles of comity allows courts to filter out those improper 
and otherwise suspect tribal proceedings as necessary. Arguably, if 
the concern were such that any uncounseled conviction are suspect, 
then affirmation of uncounseled U.S. convictions or other foreign 
convictions that deviate from U.S. constitutional procedure while 
denying Indian tribal convictions would result in an inconsistency 
that appears to fall along racial (and political) classifications. 
The arguments raised by the defendants to preclude use of their 
prior tribal convictions do not warrant much examination. Even in 
the Ninth Circuit, which determined that use of tribal uncounseled 
convictions was precluded, the basis was comparable 
unconstitutionality and not on either of the arguments discussed. 
Once the determination is made that a constitutional violation is 
not created anew, it becomes hard to argue for preclusion of 
otherwise valid tribal convictions without relying on an underlying 
assumption of tribal invalidity or dismissal of tribal sovereignty. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Reasonable minds have differed regarding the ability of the 
U.S. federal government to use uncounseled tribal convictions as 
the predicate offenses to charge an individual under § 117. The 
deviation in opinion centers around the constitutionality of using 
convictions obtained in proceedings that, had they occurred in U.S. 
courts, would have been unconstitutional. However, the 
convictions were not obtained in the U.S. court system and as such 
were not governed by the Constitution. By all accounts, the tribal 
convictions were obtained in compliance with ICRA, which 
governs these proceedings.  
Although three different cases give rise to the circuit split, at 
their cores all three cases involve the same situation: habitual 
domestic offenders, otherwise valid tribal justice proceedings and 
convictions, and additional domestic assaults warranting a higher 
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level of punishment than most tribes are able to impose. Absent 
any allegations of impropriety and in the circumstances presented 
in these three cases, use of uncounseled tribal convictions should 
not be precluded on grounds on unconstitutionality and recognition 
of those convictions should be extended on principles of comity.  
While none of the opinions express any overt biases towards 
Indian tribal proceedings, preclusion from use of tribal convictions 
could result in a step backwards in the judicial treatment of tribal 
sovereignty. Supreme Court review is crucial in affirming the 
inherent rights of Indian tribes to govern Indians in criminal 
matters and the decision will likely turn on the majority views of 
tribal sovereignty and the validity of tribal courts. If the Supreme 
Court rules otherwise, Indian domestic assault victims will be left 
vulnerable to their assailants in a way that no other U.S. citizen is 
subject to.104 
                                                                                                                                  
104 Prior to publication of this Article, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court is 
scheduled to hear oral arguments for the case January 2016. 
